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From "Federalization"to "Mixed
Governance" in Corporate Law:
A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley
ROBERT B. AHDIEHt

Since its adoption in the wake of corporate scandals at
Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing, among other major
corporations, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 has been the
subject of heated criticism. If anything, the intensity of such
attacks has grown over time. Critics have targeted both the
merits of the legislation and procedural issues surrounding
it. Most universal, however, has been the dismissal of the
Act for its "federalization" of corporate law. Judging by the
literature, every critic would seem to concur on this flaw.
For the most part, however, this seemingly jurisdictional critique is simply asserted, without close elaboration.
More troubling, this argument distinguishes itself from
assertions of the merits and process failings of the Act,
which are capable of correction. If Sarbanes-Oxley is flawed
because it "federalizes" corporate law, however, there is no
marginal adjustment to be made. Rather, the legislation
should simply be repealed.
Analysis of the expectations behind this critique is
therefore well-warranted. What are the shortcomings that
critics of Sarbanes-Oxley's "federalization" of corporate law
hope to capture? I begin by considering and putting to one
side a series of meanings that follow most naturally from
the language of "federalization"-doctrinal claims about the
t Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. A.B. 1994,
Princeton University; J.D. 1997, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Bert
Westbrook for inviting me to participate in the Buffalo Law Review's annual
essay issue, and for his counsel on this contribution. My thanks also go to Bill
Carney, Todd Henderson, Robert Schapiro, and Fred Tung for their invaluable
suggestions and corrections. Naturally, none are responsible for the myriad
errors that undoubtedly remain.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18

U.S.C.).
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appropriate content of corporate law, arguments for federalism in its more "originalist" senses, and assertions of the
benefits of competition in corporate law. Instead, I conclude,
criticism of Sarbanes-Oxley's "federalization" of corporate
law ultimately reduces to the familiar, if no less valid,
argument that presumptively efficient markets should not
be constrained by public regulation-here, SarbanesOxley's mandatory rules of corporate governance. Although
couched in the more palatable-and perhaps more
effective-rhetoric of federal jurisdiction-stripping, the real
trouble with Sarbanes-Oxley is its imposition of public
regulation where private incentives and the market have
previously held sway.
Once we acknowledge as much, it becomes clear that
some distinct verbiage is in order. Seeking to place critiques
of the Act in the best light possible, I offer the conception of
Sarbanes-Oxley's corporate governance rules as incidents of
"nationalization." Such a notion, I would argue, effectively
captures the political economy at work: the familiar
institutional competition between regulation and the
market. This choice of term is also appealing, given its
resonance with the commitment of many of SarbanesOxley's critics to a converse "privatization" of federal
securities law. As in many a transitional state, in the
conception I propose, regulation of the modern public
corporation faces simultaneous pressures toward privatization on the one hand, and nationalization on the other.
If this is the dynamic at work in the regulation of
corporate governance, how is the balance of nationalization
and privatization to play out? In the face of conflicting
demands of the public and private, recent years have seen
growing advocacy of a "third way" in macroeconomic policy.
Such a regime of mixed governance, I will suggest, may
have utility in the regulation of corporate governance as
well. A pattern of "jurisdictional redundancy"-shared
federal and state jurisdiction over corporate governancemay thus be a valuable source of innovation and change in
corporate law. Appropriately constrained, a federal role in
corporate governance may be not only permissible, but
advisable.
This essay proceeds as follows: After reviewing the
adoption and the corporate governance provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, I take up various potential implications of a "federalization" critique in Part II, concluding the

2005]

A DEFENSE OF SARBANES-OXLEY

723

latter to be a stand-in for criticisms of regulatory intervention in the market of corporate governance. With the latter
in mind, Part III offers "nationalization" as a more
appropriate appellation of the dynamic at work. Finally, in
Part IV, I offer the preliminary outlines of an argument for
"mixed governance" in corporate law, suggesting the utility
of jurisdictional redundancy in corporate regulation.
I. SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE

In June 2002, faced with corporate scandals, stock
market decline, and an impending midterm election,
Congress adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.2 Over
the preceding year, the spectacular crash of Enron,
WorldCom, Global Crossing, and other companies had
brought widespread attention to deceptive business
practices at the nation's largest corporations. In the fall of
2001, Enron, once the seventh largest firm in the country,
revealed itself to be a largely empty shell, propped up by
gross incidents of financial manipulation. 3 Among other
malfeasances, Enron had repeatedly inflated its stock
through derivatives trading and transactions with specialpurpose entities designed purely to create the illusion of
rapidly increasing earnings. 4 After the company restated its
accounts in October 2001, to reflect $618 million in third
quarter losses and a $1.2 billion 5 reduction in shareholder
equity, the firm quickly collapsed.
Rather than an isolated incident, Enron's demise
coincided with a string of other cases of corporate fraud,

2. Id.
3. See Leslie Wayne, Before Debacle, Enron Insiders Cashed in $1.1 Billion
in Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al. For a more thorough description of
the collapse of Enron, see William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect The
Interests Of Shareholders and Other Stakeholders?: Enron And The Dark Side
Of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002). See also Larry E. Ribstein,
Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 4-7 (2002).
4. See Ribstein, supra note 3, at 4.
5. See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Collapse: Audacious Climb to Success
Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, §1, at 1.
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provoking demands for a federal response. 6 An apparent
crisis situation and media frenzy around it encouraged
legislators to call a series of hearings on the corporate
scandals. 7 After an initial flurry of activity, however, the
reform proposals appeared to stall, with some contending8
that "Enron's moment as a galvanizing issue ha[d] passed."
In June 2002, however, the Securities and Exchange
Commission filed charges against WorldCom, alleging that
it had uncovered more than $9 billion in questionable
accounting. 9 The new scandal, combined with an economic
downturn and Republican Party concerns that a delay in
enacting corporate reforms could hurt it in the November
2002 midterm elections, pushed the Act to an easy
legislative victory. 10
The brief congressional debate over the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act only cursorily addressed issues of corporate governance.11 Much of the Act concerns securities regulation and
the oversight of auditors. In this spirit, the legislation increases disclosure requirements for off-balance-sheet transthe creation of a public board to
actions and mandates
12
oversee auditors.
However, the Act also expands federal regulation of
corporate governance. Section 301 of the Act requires listed
companies to utilize audit committees composed entirely of
independent directors. 13 Section 201 of the Act prohibits

6. For a discussion of several pre-Enron frauds, see Richard C. Sauer,
Financial Statement Fraud: The Boundaries of Liability Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 57 Bus. L. 955 (2002). For a discussion of the public outcry over
Enron and other corporate scandals, see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 155758 (2005).
7. See Romano, supra note 6, at 1557.
8.See Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enthusiasm Waning in
Congressfor Tougher Post-Enron Controls, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at Al.
9. See Christopher Stern, SEC Case Against WorldCom Grows: Agency
Alters Charges, Says Telecom Firm's FraudulentAccounting Could Exceed $9
Billion, WASH. POST., Nov. 6, 2002, at El.

10. See Romano, supra note 6, at 1528.
11. See id. at 1549-51.
12. See § 401(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (Supp. II 2002) (disclosure requirements);
§ 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. II 2002).
13. See § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m) (Supp. II 2002).
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accounting firms from providing an enumerated list of nonaudit services to firms that they audit. 14 Sarbanes-Oxley
further prohibits corporations from extending credit to
15
executive officers or directors, with limited exceptions.
Additionally, both the CEO and CFO of the firm must
certify that the company's periodic reports fairly present
the firm's financial condition. 16 Finally, and perhaps keyed
to the latter, in the event of a material restatement of the
company's financial statements, any bonus, incentive, or
equity compensation paid to the CEO or CFO must be
forfeited. 17 It is these rules of corporate governance that are
the subject of interest herein.

II. AGAINST THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW
For all the rhetoric and ambition surrounding its
adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been battered by
criticism from its inception. If anything, such attacks have
grown in intensity over time. Three types of criticism stand
out: Some have criticized the Act on the merits. Others have
questioned issues of process surrounding the legislation.
Most universal, however, has been the critique of SarbanesOxley for its "federalization" of corporate law. After briefly
reviewing the merits and process critiques of the Act, it is
this final, seemingly "jurisdictional" objection I hope to
dissect herein.
As to the merits, two criticisms deserve acknowledgement. Most common is the asserted disconnect between
Sarbanes-Oxley's purported ends and enumerated means.
The rhetoric surrounding adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act framed it as a response to the corporate scandals of
2001-2002.18 Yet it is not clear that the Act's corporate
governance provisions-its requirement of independent
audit committees, its restrictions on corporations' purchase
of non-audit services from their auditors, its prohibition of
14. See § 201(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (Supp. II 2002).
15. See § 402(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. II 2002).
16. See § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp II. 2002).
17. See § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (Supp. II 2002). My enumeration of the
corporate governance provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is borrowed from
Roberta Romano. See Romano, supra note 6, at 1527.
18. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H5462 (2002) (remarks of Congressman Oxley).
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corporate loans to officers, and its requirements of executive
certification of financial statements and of executive forfeiture of bonuses and other incentives in the event of a
material restatement-will actually impact the sources of
those scandals. Aggressive financial management by
corporate executives undoubtedly played a role in the
collapse of Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and other
corporations. 19 At least in part, the scandals also derived
from the inherent ambiguity of accounting obligations in
the modern business corporation. 20 The widespread use of
financial derivatives 21 and cognitive failures in small group
decision-making 22 are also among the likely sources.
Yet Sarbanes-Oxley did little or nothing to address
these issues. 23 A restriction on the source of audit services
and a prohibition on corporate loans, whatever their merits,
arguably do not speak to any of the sources of the Enron,
WorldCom, Global Crossing, or other corporate scandals.
More broadly, one might question whether any regulatory
change could address the pattern of increasingly aggressive
management of U.S. public corporations. 24 The inherent
challenges of effective corporate accounting and the perhaps
related under-regulation of derivative instruments also
remain unaddressed. 25 For this group of critics, then, the
19. See Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 279, 284. It bears recalling, however, that Enron was often held up as a
model of corporate governance in the years preceding its collapse.
20. See David A. Westbrook, CorporationLaw After Enron: The Possibility of
a Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 88-89 (2003); see also Roberta
Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate
Governance?, 5, Mar. 27, 2005 (NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository,
Working Paper), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1018&context=nyu/lewp.
21. See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death
of "May", 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245 (2003).
22. See E. Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An

Examination of the Audit Committee Solution to CorporateFraud,55 ADMIN. L.
REV. 357 (2003).
23. See generally Romano, supra note 6; David A. Westbrook, Telling All:
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Ideal of Transparency,2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.
441,445.

24. See Ribstein, supra note 19, at 284.
25. Questioning the existence of any linkage between the sources of the
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and other scandals and Sarbanes-Oxley's
legislative mandates, Roberta Romano notes the citation of those scandals in
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act's regulatory mandates do not survive a
legislated means are not
basic ends-means test. The Act's
26
aligned with its asserted ends.
A distinct argument on the merits speaks not to the
efficacy of the Act's provisions, but to their wisdom. In this
critique, the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley (grossly) outweigh its
asserted benefits. This argument has most commonly been
proffered with reference to the legislation's reporting and
certification requirements. 27 The latter has been of
particular concern with smaller corporations, moreover, for
a
whom Sarbanes-Oxley compliance has come to represent
28
significant and growing share of administrative costs.
As to Sarbanes-Oxley's corporate governance provisions
in particular, Roberta Romano has analyzed available
empirical evidence regarding the utility of each provision.
In each case, she concludes the benefits are limited, at
best. 29 As to costs, meanwhile, problematic examples
readily present themselves. The prohibition on loans to
officers, for example, discourages preferred compensation
mechanisms, replacing them with less efficient means to
achieve comparable payouts. 30 The exclusion of non-audit
the legislative advocacy of campaign finance reform, notwithstanding the
absence of any claim that the corporate misconduct at issue in those cases had
anything to do with campaign contributions. See Romano, supra note 6, at 1526.
26. Some would go further, to argue that certain provisions may actually
aggravate the problems that triggered Enron et al. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi &
Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher FinancingProposalfor Securities
Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 337-38 (2003) (suggesting constraints on nonaudit services may leave independent auditing under-funded).
27. See Romano, supra note 6, at 1587-89.
28. See id. at 1588-89. Bill Carney attempts to quantify these costs in the
growing pattern of "going private" transactions. See William J. Carney, The
Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of "Going Private", 55
05-4,
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2005), (Emory Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
67276
1.
2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
In going private, public corporations sacrifice liquidity, but are also freed from
their obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley and the securities laws generally.
29. See Romano, supra note 6, at 1529-43; see also Larry E. Ribstein,
Sarbanes-Oxley after Three Years (Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
LE05-016, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soll3/papers.cfm?abstractid=746884.
30. See M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A
Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol13/papers.cfm?
abstract-id=597661; Romano, supra note 6, at 1538-39.

728

BUFFALO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 53

services, meanwhile, may reduce funding for independent
auditing and increase the cost of auditing services for
significant numbers of corporations. 31 The certification
requirement,
finally, gives rise to massive compliance
costs, 32 and may reduce optimal participation in the capital
33
markets.
Aside from the merits, two process criticisms of
Sarbanes-Oxley also deserve note. The first speaks to the
legislative process behind the Act's adoption, and the
second to the agency delegation attendant to the Act.
Roberta Romano has sharply criticized the SarbanesOxley Act as a case of "emergency legislation"-what she
characterizes as legislation adopted in the face of high
discount rates among legislators. 34 Given the latter, she
posits, legislative attention is necessarily diminished,
debate is limited, and opportunities for interest group
influence are enhanced. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with the
frenetic media coverage of Enron, WorldCom, Global
Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco, and other spectacular corporate
implosions, and the ensuing abandonment of any meaningful political resistance to the legislation, is a classic case of
emergency legislation.
In Romano's view, such legislation should be subject to
some-at least mild-presumption of error. As a result of
its accelerated review and adoption, such legislation poses
significantly greater risks of both honest mistakes and
special interest abuse. Given these risks, Romano proposes
the inclusion of legislative sunsets in emergency legislation,
and their incorporation into Sarbanes-Oxley. 35
The second procedural critique of Sarbanes-Oxley
echoes concerns of a longer pedigree. Many have criticized
the Act's delegation to the Securities and Exchange
Commission of rule-making authority for its corporate gov-

31. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 26, at 337-38.
32. See Romano, supra note 6, at 1543 n.61.
33. See Carney, supra note 28.
34. See Romano, supra note 6, at 1557.
35. See id. at 1600.
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ernance provisions. 36 The Commission, the argument goes,
has long been prone to regulatory overreaching. 37 It can
therefore be expected to use the Act's specific warrants to
pursue more general incursions into corporate governance. 38 Limited (or at least narrower) delegations would
thus have been preferable.
This is intertwined with many critics' sense of the Act's
corporate governance rules as a fruition of the SEC's
longstanding agenda to insert itself into corporate
governance. Such critics flag the Commission's history of
efforts to impose, by administrative fiat, some of the same
39
provisions ultimately incorporated into Sarbanes-Oxley.
More generally, they point to the aforementioned pattern of
SEC attempts, some successful and others not, to regulate
corporate governance.
Of course, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a legislative
intervention into corporate law, is not prone to criticism as
regulatory overreaching. Yet the spirit of that argument
would seem to persist in critiques of the Act. Even though
Sarbanes-Oxley is not itself overreaching, it is likely-in
the hands of an aggressively competitive and rent-seeking
federal regulatory agency-to invite such over-reaching.
Whatever their wisdom or shortcomings, it is not my
goal to pass judgment on these critiques; the SarbanesOxley Act may well be fatally flawed on one or more of the
above grounds. Instead, I take up an argument on which all
of the Act's critics would appear to agree. Seeming to
challenge the Act on jurisdictional grounds of a sort, no
criticism of Sarbanes-Oxley would appear to be complete
without a dismissal of the Act for its "federalization of
corporate law."

36. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of CorporateGovernance, 30
DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005).

37. Cf. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the
SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2003).

38. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the InstitutionalInvestor: A HalfTime Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 877-78 (1994); David Jonathan White,
Rulemaking Under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1313,
1348-49 (1983).
39. See Karmel, supra note 36, at 86-91; Romano, supra note 6, at 1534, 1541.

730

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

Notably, this argument is different in kind from each of
the foregoing claims. Each critique of Sarbanes-Oxley on
the merits or process goes to specific features in the design
or adoption of the legislation, which might-at least
theoretically-be subject to amendment or adjustment. As
to each of these criticisms, Congress could have gotten it
right. The "federalization" critique, by contrast, permits no
such response. It is a conversation-stopper. The problem is
not how the Act "federalizes" corporate law, nor the extent
to which it does so; rather, it is the fact that it does so at all.
Widespread and dispositive as it appears, this jurisdictional-sounding argument deserves our attention. What
precisely do the myriad authors of this critique mean to
criticize? More precisely, is it really "federalization" to
which they object? In assessing as much, we may better
appreciate what is at stake, and perhaps
open the door to
40
distinct approaches to reconciliation.
To begin with, the critique of Sarbanes-Oxley for its
federalization of corporate law might be seen to rest on
some doctrinal segregation of state corporate law and
federal securities regulation. The Act's corporate law
provisions are flawed, in this view, because they overstep a
line in the sand-a supra-legislative internal affairs
doctrine-marking the legitimate content of corporate law
versus securities regulation. If corporate and securities law
enjoy some consistently divergent content, Congress's
extension of federal mandates from securities law to the
inherently distinct realm of corporate law might arguably
be illegitimate, or at least unwise.
Emanations of this view might be perceived in forceful
talk of disclosure as the appropriate domain of federal
securities law, as opposed to the corporate governance rules
incorporated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. To similar effect is
the reference to federal rules as oriented to process rather
than substance. Finally, talk of Sarbanes-Oxley's "inconsis-

40. Talk of Sarbanes-Oxley's "federalization" of corporate law mightdistinctly from the analysis I offer-also be criticized for its sweeping tenor.
After Sarbanes-Oxley, such rhetoric would seem to imply, all corporate law is
federal. Unless those who invoke the language of "federalization" conceive of
corporate law as an integrated unit, any part of which subsumes the whole,
Sarbanes-Oxley must be acknowledged to federalize only limited aspects of
corporate law.
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tency"41with the internal affairs doctrine is in a similar
spirit.
Insofar as critics of Sarbanes-Oxley's "federalization" of
corporate law mean to explicitly or implicitly invoke some
doctrinal barrier to Sarbanes-Oxley's corporate governance
provisions, they must fall short. No line of sufficient
impermeability to categorically exclude any and all possible
42
federal interventions into corporate law can be identified.
Some traditional orientation of federal law to the regulation
of securities issuances, disclosure, and secondary trading,
and of state law to corporate governance, is beyond dispute.
But tradition alone, without doctrinal foundation, cannot
to
support a categorical (or jurisdictional) challenge
43
Sarbanes- Oxley's corporate governance mandates.
By way of doctrinal segregation, however, two lines of
argument might potentially be offered. Most significant has
been the effort to characterize corporate law as private in
nature, in contrast with public securities law. In the
alternative, some have sought to define corporate law as the
regulation of substance, while securities law is directed to
process. These possibilities can be considered in turn.
As suggested by Amir Licht, corporate law undoubtedly
44
exhibits features favoring its classification as private law.
Over the course of the twentieth century, conceptions of
business corporations as public rather than private in
nature gradually
fell by the wayside. Although
controversial at first, this private classification has become
increasingly settled, including through the advent of federal
securities law and its more direct association (than
corporate law) with the protection of public investors.
41. Cf. Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REV. 590, 596-97
(2003).
42. See Patrick Moyer, The Regulation of Corporate Law by Securities
Regulators: A Comparison of Ontario and the United States, 55 U. TOR. FAC. L.
REV. 43, 46-58 (1997). In proposing extension of corporate law's market-model
to securities law, of course, Roberta Romano and other advocates of issuer
choice implicitly or explicitly rely on the absence of any difference in kind
between the two fields. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to SecuritiesRegulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
43. Arguably, invocation of the internal affairs "doctrine" in criticisms of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act bespeaks some such appeal to tradition.
44. See Amir N. Licht, Stock Exchange Mobility, UnilateralRecognition, and
the Privatizationof Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 583, 610-12 (2001).
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Modern theories of the firm, as a "nexus of contracts," have
further solidified the classification of corporations as private in nature, and of corporate law as private law.
Other indicia of the private nature of corporate law can
also be identified. Corporate law, like other forms of private
law (and by contrast with securities regulation), is almost
exclusively a product of primary legislation. Further, the
enforcement of corporate law is ordinarily retrospective,
and plays out in judicial proceedings, rather than through
prospective administrative procedures. Finally, the enabling character of corporate law also favors its classification
securities regulation, in contrast, is largely
as private law;
45
mandatory.
On the other hand, at least some indications point to at
least some public dimension in corporate law. This begins
with the original conception of business corporations as
public in nature. 46 While the latter has been displaced as
the conventional wisdom, recent years have begun to see
some challenge to the nexus of contracts and a reassertion
of public dimensions of the modern corporation. 47 Bert
Westbrook, for example, has drawn on the collapse of Enron
to offer a conception of corporate law as policing not the
relationship between managers and shareholders, but the
emphatically public bound between both the latter and
former, as "owners," and the wider world of "non-owners." 48
Even more broadly, it has been posited that the private is
the necessary medium of the public in the market-driven
state. 49
The ambiguity in corporate law's public character is
confirmed by the important "private" features of securities
law. 50 Even more telling may be the array of pre-SarbanesOxley federal, mandatory, and hence public interjections
45. See id. at 610-15. As to each of these features, of course, the converse is
true with reference to securities law, favoring the generalized conception of the
latter as public law. See id.
46. Berle and Means' seminal work on corporate governance, in fact, pressed
a public conception of the firm. See id. at 611.
47. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
48. See Westbrook, supra note 20, at 108-10.
49. The general sustainability of the public-private distinction, as this
implies, has been subject to question in recent years.
50. See Licht, supranote 44, at 607-15.
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into corporate governance, including the proxy rules'
implications for corporate voting, the regulation of
fundamental changes in corporate structure, and the
prohibition against insider trading. 51 Given this succession
of interventions, it is impossible to argue that the "public"
rules of the securities regulation regime have had nothing
to say about the "private" law of corporate governance.
The aforementioned public elements of, and public
interventions in, corporate law do not undermine the
generally private character of corporate law. Yet they do
undermine assertions of the exclusively private character of
corporate law. A categorical rejection of any public intervention into corporate law, however, requires just such clarity.
Whatever distinction of private and public may separate
the realm of corporate law from federal, mandatory, and
public securities law, it is not sufficiently absolute to
support such a categorical preclusion.
The same is true of the attempt to differentiate
corporate law from securities law, as the regulation of
substance versus process. In this spirit, Judge Easterbrook
has described federal proxy rules as regulating process, in
contrast with state corporate law's substantive rules of
governance. 52 The distinction of substance from disclosure
is simply a particular53iteration of this contrast between
substance and process.
As in the case of the public-private distinction, it cannot
be disputed that federal regulation of business organizations has been primarily oriented to procedural requirements. By contrast, state law offers the lion's share of
substantive rules of corporate governance, even if only in
enabling form. As Judge Easterbrook himself acknowledges,
however, significant ambiguity attends the substanceprocess distinction in numerous areas. 54 The case of the
proxy rules is instructive. While facially directed to
questions of process, the federal rules go, for practical
51. See id. at 608-09; see also Karmel, supra note 36, at 83 n.10 (enumerating
long series of federal legislative interventions in corporate governance).
52. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496,
503 (7th Cir. 1989).

53. See P.C. Berg, The Limits of SEC Authority Under Section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act, 17 J. CORP. L. 311, 314 (1992).
54. See Amanda Acquisition, 877 F.2d at 503-04.
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purposes, to the heart of a corporation's internal affairs. 55
One might similarly ask whether Sarbanes-Oxley's regulation of audit committee membership and its executive
certification requirement are themselves directed to
"process"-as might arguably seem on their face-or to the
substance of corporate governance.
Laying a doctrinal foundation for a "federalization"
critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, then, is not easy.
Neither public-private nor process-substance distinctions
between federal law and state law offer an impermeable
barrier between the two. Each indisputably captures the
general corpus of each body of law, yet also leaves room for
federal intervention-even if only selective-into the
private, substantive realm of corporate governance. Neither
distinction, in sum, establishes a constraint against every
possible federal regulation of corporate law.
Beyond doctrine, the rhetoric of "federalization" can
alternatively-and reasonably-be inferred to rest on some
claim of federalism. Federalism claims assert a variety of
rationales for the greater legitimacy and wisdom of local
versus national authority. 56 Closest to "originalist" visions
of federalism, local authorities are most likely to appreciate
and execute the will of local populations, advancing the
ends of liberalism. Following directly from the latter,
federalism offers an efficient diversity of policy choice.
Pareto-preferred policies can be implemented in particular
locales, avoiding the application of undesirably homogenized rules across jurisdictions.
Critics of Sarbanes-Oxley for its "federalization" of
corporate law might be read to assert similar arguments, in
this case favoring state regulation of corporate governance. 57 The subjects of regulation in corporate law, as well
as the substantive ends sought, naturally present a
somewhat more ambiguous case for these more historical
arguments for federalism. Even if some analogy can be
made, however, two stumbling blocks present themselves.
55. See Roe, supra note 41, at 611.
56. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism,
91 IOwA L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 31-42, on file with author),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=734644.
57. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of
CorporateLaw, REG., Spring 2003, at 26, 27-28.
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To begin with, arguments for local autonomy and policy
diversity do not, on their own, distinguish between the
existing corpus of federal law and state law applicable to
business associations. Absent some such line, however, the
federalism argument would seem to prove more than 58the
median Sarbanes-Oxley critic is willing to acknowledge. If
federalism dictates local rules of corporate governance to
encourage local autonomy and to facilitate desirable
variation, federal rules should fail more generally. If
federalism claims undermine Sarbanes-Oxley's interventions into corporate law, they would seem to condemn
federal securities law as well. Taken to their logical, and
relatively proximate, conclusion, federalism arguments
against Sarbanes-Oxley favor the shift of both corporate
and securities regulation to the states. This may be for the
best. As a policy prescription, however, it constitutes a more
radical deviation from the status quo than Sarbanes59
Oxley.
More importantly, the nature of state corporate law
undermines any federalism claim of the above variety.
While corporate law is defined by individual states, both the
theory of state competition in corporate law and the
empirical reality thereof run counter to arguments for local
autonomy and policy diversity. State competition for
corporate charters, at heart, rests on legislative capacity for
the rapid incorporation of efficient innovations undertaken
by competing states. As this impliedly suggests, the
essential premise of corporate law is not that state
corporate rules will diverge to capture particularized
morays-whether geographic or substantive. Rather, the

58. Among the exceptions are Roberta Romano. See, e.g., Romano, s.pra
note 6, at 1593 ("Moreover, a persuasive case can be made that the benefits of
the federal regulatory regime [of the 1933 and 1934 Acts] have not been worth
the cost.").
59. Most critics of Sarbanes-Oxley's federalization of corporate law might
thus be seen to want their cake and eat it too. Unless they are willing to throw
the securities law baby out with the Sarbanes-Oxley bathwater, however, the
above federalism arguments against Sarbanes-Oxley fall short. Concurring with
Roberta Romano, I believe that coherence demands something more. See
Romano, supra note 20, at 40-41 (suggesting commentators are seeking "a way
out" of the choice between a race to the top and a race to the bottom, given that
strong evidence of the former creates "a need to reexamine the foundations of
the federal government's role in securities regulation, as the object of regulation
is the same").
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operative premise of the relevant race-regardless of
whether it runs to the top or to the bottom-is a pattern of
convergence. This is the expected result, rather than the
accommodation of local60 norms of corporate governance,
whatever they might be.
The empirical reality bears this out. Delaware enjoys
significant market share in the incorporation business. 61
With defined exceptions, meanwhile, the law of competing
62
jurisdictions tracks significant features of Delaware law.
Whether for better or worse, then, corporate law cannot be
readily construed to serve the autonomy and diversity
functions of federalism. There is, for the most part, a
national corporate law in the United States; it is simply
enacted by the state of Delaware.
Even if what might be posited as "pure" federalism
arguments are ineffective challenges to the corporate
governance provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, however, secondorder claims of federalism 63 remain. Critics of SarbanesOxley thus indisputably intend to suggest the utility of
experimentation by and competition among local regulators
in their criticism of the Act's "federalization" of corporate
law. State corporate law permits state regulators to pursue
new legal technologies they deem likely to offer competitive
advantage. If they are right, such innovations can be
expected to take hold, both in the state of innovation and

60. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 212-18 (1991); see also Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for CorporateLaw, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 454
(2001).
61. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely
Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J.

553, 555-56 (2002).
62. See William J. Carney, The Productionof Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L.
REv. 715, 731-34 (1998) (observing high degree of uniformity among states on
both core and non-core corporate charter terms, using multiple measures). It
bears noting that Delaware is not always the innovator in state charter
competition. Rather, other states are often the first-mover. Delaware has
proven adept, however, at identifying and incorporating desirable innovations
of its competitors. See id. at 741-42.
63. Federalism arguments premised on local experimentation and interjurisdictional competition thus were not at the heart of the Federalist Papers
and other early American analyses of federalism. Among other reasons, this can
be traced back to the impracticability of geographic mobility in the Eighteenth
Century American colonies.
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among its competitors. If undesirable, they can promptly be
discarded. Even if flawed rules persist, they do minimum
harm. Universally applicable federal rules, by contrast,
and innovation-the hallmarks of an
stifle experimentation
64
efficient market.
It is not clear, however, that such experimentation and
competition are as vibrant as theory would have it. Michael
Abramowicz posits externalities arising from corporate law
innovation to lead to a "crawl to the top. '6 5 Marcel Kahan
and Ehud Kamar identify barriers to entry and aspects of
as constraints
the political economy 66of charter competition
67
on active competition. Others concur.
Even if such competition (and the experimentation
behind it) is active, however, its presence or absence is not
inherently a question of federal versus state law. Rather, its
necessary prerequisite is access to multiple regulating
jurisdictions. Where corporations may elect to be governed
by any one of a multiplicity of regulatory authorities, the
window opens for experimentation and competition. Among
multiple competing jurisdictions, a given jurisdiction's
innovation-altered rules for electronic proxies, for
example-will be subject to demand and price feedback.
What allows competition in corporate law to be
conceived as a "federal" question, thus, is not the adoption
of relevant rules by national versus local authorities.
Rather, it is the traditionally mandatory nature of rules
adopted under federal law, and the enabling nature of state
corporate law. Were federal rules of corporate law enabling,
federal law would be largely unobjectionable. 68 Likewise, if

64. See Carney, supra note 62, at 734-55; see also Roberta Romano, Law as a
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225
(1985).
65. See Michael Abramowicz, Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J.
ON REG. 139 (2003).

66. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
CorporateLaw, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002).
67. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence
Favor State Competition in CorporateLaw?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002). But see
Romano, supra note 20.
68. My slight caveat acknowledges that federal default rules might have a
disproportionately strong focal effect-and hence coordinative power-as
compared with state default rules. Cf. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
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state rules were effectively mandatory, Sarbanes-Oxley
would at least raise far milder objections.
To be more explicit, the critics of Sarbanes-Oxley's
"federalization" would likely object no less forcefully to
unwaivable and unavoidable state law. Imagine, thus, if the
state of California were to transform its corporate default
rules into mandatory rules, but were also to give those rules
bite. Specifically, what if it were to mandate local
incorporation by all entities for whom the state is the
primary, or perhaps merely a significant, place of business?
Less invasively, but no less aggressively, it might impose
certain minimum rules of corporate governance on all
entities doing business in the state. It does not take much
imagination to conceive the likely response of those critical
of Sarbanes-Oxley's "federalization" of corporate law. It
would, I wager, be identical to their reaction to Sarbanes69
Oxley.
It becomes apparent, then, that the critique of
Sarbanes-Oxley's "federalization" of corporate law is only
incidentally a question of federal authority. Critics of
Sarbanes-Oxley have no greater affection for state outreach
statutes than for federal rules of corporate law. The trouble,
this suggests, is not jurisdictional. Rather, I would posit, it
is regulatory.
Critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's "federalization" of
corporate law undoubtedly do bewail the loss of experimentation and competition it engenders. The sacrificed
result of that competition, however, is not efficient regulation, at least as regulation is ordinarily conceived; rather, it
is a species of deregulation. Sarbanes-Oxley's "federalization" is questioned not because it gets the rules wrong, in
this view, but because it imposes rules.
On its face, the rhetoric of "federalization" might
appear to offer a jurisdictional objection to Sarbanes-Oxley.
State rules, it suggests, are more efficient than federal

CONFLICT 54-55 (2d ed. 1980); Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory
of Law in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 215, 245-55 (2004).

69. In fact, the above scenario need not be imagined. California's unusually
broad outreach statute, in Section 2115 of its Corporations Code, CAL. CORP.
CODE § 2115 (West 2001), imposes an array of the state's corporate governance
rules on corporations primarily doing business in the state. Advocates of charter
competition, unsurprisingly, find Section 2115 abhorrent.
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rules. The parallel assertion of a choice between "default"
rules and "mandatory" rules is of similar effect. Yet such
language obscures more than it reveals. A preference for
default rules is not a preference for more efficient rules, but
control. Default rules, in this view,
a preference for market
70
are not "rules" at all.
Of course, the desired market is a "regulatory" market.
But a market in state corporate law is still a market. The
motivating force behind regulatory design in a world of
default rules, negotiated via regulatory competition, is not
(even asserted) public interest, one would suggest, but
private incentive. 71 If a given default rule comports with
private preferences, it survives market competition; if not,
it is waived. To similar effect, if a state's corporate law
regime (including both its default rules and its "trivial"
it is embraced
mandatory rules) advances private interests,
72
via incorporation; if not, it is abandoned.
This is not to suggest that state corporate law,
comprised of default rules and subject to interstate competition, amounts to nothing more than a contract law regime.
Corporate entities do not literally write their own ticket.
Minimally, common law fiduciary duties offer a layer of
73
extra-contractual constraints on corporate governance.
More importantly, the regulatory preferences of corporate
entities are codified through political mechanisms,

70. The handful of mandatory rules, meanwhile, are "trivial." See Bernard
S. Black, Is CorporateLaw Trivial?:A Politicaland Economic Analysis, 84 Nw.
U. L. REV. 542 (1990).

71. I do not mean, at least for the moment, to offer any normative critique of
this result. The interplay of private incentives, absent externalities or other
market failures, may effectively maximize social welfare. Regardless of the end
result, however, the dynamic at work cannot be equated with any conventional
conception of regulation.
72. It might be objected that it is now my argument that proves too much; if
the above arguments hold true, it is not regulatory competition in corporate law
that is less "regulation" than "market," but all regulatory competition. I would
not necessarily dispute as much. On the other hand, the relative ease of
reincorporation, compared with other opportunities to "walk with one's feet," as
well as the liquid securities markets and resulting ease of pricing regulatory
choices in corporate governance, may arguably heighten the strength of
competition, and hence the market dynamic, in corporate law versus other
regulatory fields.
73. Some, of course, conceive even the body of common law-and its
fiduciary duties in particular-as an uiber-default rule of sorts.
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necessarily introducing some "imperfection" into the market
of corporate law. Given the ultimate grounding of the
process in private incentives, however, the theory of
corporate law does not stray all that far from a contract
regime. 74 Although few scholars have been prepared to put
forward a normative claim for such reductionism, the
underlying theory of corporate law necessarily assumes it. 7 5
In this view, the critique of Sarbanes-Oxley for its
"federalization" of corporate law is not about federal versus
state regulation, but about the imposition of public
regulation, where private incentives have heretofore played
out in a market dynamic. At the extreme, it is not federal
law to which critics of the Act's "federalization" object; it is
law-or at least law in a command-and-control, regulatory
sense. Such an argument is rarely articulated by critics of
Sarbanes-Oxley, most of whom would prefer a less forceful
stance. 76 Yet criticism of Sarbanes-Oxley's "federalization"
of corporate law ultimately must either rest on a generalized claim of the efficiency of a market dynamic or mean
nothing at all.
Preference for a vague critique of "federalization" over a
broad condemnation of regulation is hardly surprising, of
course, given the likely greater resonance of an implied
defense of doctrinal consistency and coherence, of local
autonomy and diversity, and of competition-desirable
virtues one and all. By contrast, if Sarbanes-Oxley is not a
case of "federalization," but merely of "regulation,"
criticisms of the Act simply echo a longstanding debate, in
innumerable contexts, regarding the need for public
74. See Ribstein, supra note 3, at 48; Romano, supra note 20, at 3
(characterizing competitive regulatory regime as "the working of a market"); cf.
Bayless Manning, Shareholders Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962); Roe, supra note 41, at 594 (describing regime
as "something akin to organized private lawmaking among the corporate
players"). Let me emphasize that the assessment I put forward need not be
equated with a race to the bottom. Even if state corporate law were no more
than contract law, some general confidence in the efficiency of free contract
might support expectations of a race to the top. That state competition over
corporate default rules reduces to a market dynamic thus says nothing about
whether that market is efficient or inefficient.
75. Henry Manne, perhaps unsurprisingly, is among the exceptions. See
Henry G. Manne, A Free Market Model of a Large Corporation System, 52
EMORY L.J. 1381 (2003).
76. See supra note 59.
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intervention in private markets. I would argue, however,
that Sarbanes-Oxley's rules of corporate governance are
properly understood as no more, and no less. If I am right,
talk of a "federalization" of corporate law has no place.
Instead, placing criticisms of Sarbanes-Oxley in the best
light possible, one might posit its interventions as a case of
"nationalization."
III. IN PRAISE OF NATIONALIZATION

What makes the seemingly jurisdictional critique of
Sarbanes-Oxley's "federalization" of corporate law an issue
of "nationalization"? At first glance, this conception may
seem no better suited to critics' operative concerns with the
Act. The Oxford English Dictionary thus defines nationalization, inter alia, as "the action of bringing land,77property, industries, etc., under the control of the nation.
Construing the concept in only slightly broader terms,
however, one might conceive of nationalization as the
assertion of public control in circumstances where private
controls were theretofore dominant. Such assertions of
control will conventionally involve state claims of
ownership, which naturally are inapposite here. Rather, I
posit a "nationalization" of corporate regulation, with enabling, market-driven constraints displaced by mandatory,
state-defined rules. This, I believe, is what critics of
Sarbanes-Oxley truly condemn. Though couched within a
it is such "nationalization" that
rubric of "federalization,"
78
motivates their concerns.
The admittedly unusual construction of SarbanesOxley's corporate governance mandates as incidents of
''nationalization" may also be useful in framing debates
over the Act within the political economy that is actually at
work. 79 The status quo before Sarbanes-Oxley was not a
77. 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 32 (1933).

78. Alternative characterizations might also be imagined. "Legalization" or
"regulation," for example, capture the pattern at work. Likewise, the
"imposition" or "introduction" of "law" or "regulation." None of the foregoing,
however, is significantly less ambiguous than "nationalization." Meanwhile,
they resonate less well with other usages in the corporate and securities law
literature, which I outline above.
79. Cf. Westbrook, supra note 20, at 126 ("[C]orporation law scholarship
over the last few generations has lacked an adequate political economy.").
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regime of state regulation of corporate governance, at least
in any conventional sense. Rather, corporate law was
defined by a pattern of regulatory competition. Within this
competition, meanwhile, the fight was not between distinct
bodies of mandatory law, but alternative menus of default
rules. Again, therefore, the true implication of SarbanesOxley--obscured by the rhetoric of "federalization"-is not
the displacement of state rules with federal rules, but the
imposition of regulation on a relatively
de-regulated
0
market-a species of nationalization.8
That Sarbanes-Oxley's imposition of federal rules of
corporate law constitutes a case of nationalization is also in
line with the notion of corporate law as a "product."81 As
posited by Roberta Romano, modern corporate law can be
fairly understood as a product, the quality of which is likely
to be advanced by competition among suppliers-various
state legislatures. The welfare of relevant consumers82
shareholders and managers-is improved as a result.
If corporate law is a product of sorts, however, its
production may naturally be subject to nationalization. Like
the production of any other technology, erstwhile private
production can selectively-or comprehensively, for that
matter-be brought into public hands. Minimally, public
regulation of private production-whether of law or
widgets-may be warranted where public interests are at
stake, and in danger. Whether because of externalities or
other barriers to efficiency, few would dispute at least the
possibility of public intervention in private production. Yet
that is the very nature of Sarbanes-Oxley.
This naturally leads to a converse virtue of the
characterization of Sarbanes-Oxley's corporate governance
provisions as a form of nationalization. A conception of the
critique of Sarbanes-Oxley as an argument against nationalization jibes well with the preference of many of

80. As acknowledged above, the status quo obviously amounts to something
more than a pure market, given the intervening medium of legislative action.
Furthermore, common law fiduciary duties overlay the contractual dynamic at
work. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
81. See Romano, supra note 64.
82. See Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation:From U.S. Corporate Charter
Competition to Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L.
REV. 525, 539 (2005).
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Sarbanes-Oxley's critics for a "privatization" of securities
law.8 3 Again, preeminent among these scholars has been
Roberta Romano, who has argued forcefully for the
introduction of regulatory competition to securities law, to
parallel the charter competition behind corporate law.
Under the rubric of "issuer choice," such a regime would
permit corporations to elect the body of securities law
applicable to their issuances.8 4 Echoing arguments in favor
of enabling corporate law rules and state competition for
incorporations, Romano and others have posited that such a
"privatization" of securities law will induce its own race to
the top, a virtuous cycle in which efficient levels of
disclosure will be achieved.8 5 For our purposes, such a
privatization of securities law is readily understood as the
perfect converse to Sarbanes-Oxley's nationalization of
corporate law. The objections of Romano and others to
Sarbanes-Oxley, thus, are the perfect corollary to their
advocacy of issuer choice.
In the balance of privatization and nationalization,
however, the discourse of recent years has been dominated
by the prospects of privatization. In 1998, Romano
developed the terms of such a privatization of securities
law.8 6 Contemporaneously, Stephen Choi and Andrew
Guzman offered their own, slightly distinct proposal for a
regime of issuer choice.8 7 In the ensuing years, debates have
88
raged between advocates and opponents of issuer choice.

83. As used in this context, such "privatization" arises from the opportunity
for issuer choice in the selection of governing securities rules, akin to that
offered in the selection of a firm's place of incorporation.
84. See Tung, supranote 82, at 529-30.
85. See Romano, supra note 42.
86. See id.
87. See Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking
the InternationalReach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998).

In fact, Choi and Guzman first broached this possibility in an earlier piece. See
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritorialityof
American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'LL. & Bus. 207, 231 (1996).

88. For criticisms of issuer choice, see, for example, James D. Cox,
Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 122937 (1999); Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.

613 (2001). A slightly removed critique is offered by Fred Tung. See Tung, supra
note 82 (challenging applicability of issuer choice to transnational securities
regulation); see also Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political
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In the meantime, other means for the privatization of
securities law have also been pressed. Paul Mahoney has
posited that securities regulation should be delegated-or
returned, to be more precise-to the stock exchanges.8 9 Kim
Krawiec, meanwhile, has argued that the regulation of
"outsider trading" should be left to private litigation. 90
Beyond such scholarly advocacy of privatization, at
least implicit examples of privatization can also be
identified. Within the securities regulation regime, for
example, the differential treatment of certain types of
issuances-including those in amounts less than $5 million
and Rule 144A securities-offers a dimension of choice. 91
The availability of various private causes of action
pertaining to duties under the federal securities laws,
including their antifraud provisions, might also be noted. 92
To similar effect is the ability to arbitrate securities law
disputes, a hallmark of private law. 93 The most significant
aspect of privatized securities law, however, may be the
present-day availability of some degree of issuer choice. As
suggested by Amir Licht, stock exchange mobility and
resulting competition have indirectly engendered such a
dynamic of choice: Issuers today enjoy the opportunity to
list their stock under a variety of competing regulatory
94
regimes.

Yet the converse pattern of nationalization remains
part of the political economy of corporate regulation as well.
While less prominent, and perhaps less in the nature of a
trend, these incidents have also been important. Mark Roe
identifies several such cases, some explicit and others more
subtle. 95 These include the SEC's adoption of its all-holders
rule, its indirect elimination of dual-class recapitalizations,
Economy of Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 2002 WIs. L.
REV. 1363.
89. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange As Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997).
90. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Privatizing"OutsiderTrading" 41 VA. J. INT'L
L. 693 (2001).
91. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation:
A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 531, 544-46 (2001).
92. See Licht, supra note 44, at 613.
93. See id. at 613-14.
94. See generally id.
95. See Roe, supra note 41, at 619-22.
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and its imposition of proxy statement access for mere
"precatory" proposals by shareholders.
Of course, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's corporate governance provisions constitute a further data point along this
line. Rather than an aberration, thus, Sarbanes-Oxley is
simply the latest incidence of some nationalization of
corporate law. Rather than unprecedented, it is one among
various examples of selective nationalization of corporate
law, not unlike the incidents of securities law privatization
enumerated above.
The real question of Sarbanes-Oxley, then, is not the
wisdom of some radical departure from the existing
regulatory regime governing business associations, as
critics of the legislation would have one believe. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act simply adds its piece to an already
mixed regime of public mandatory rules and private
enabling rules for corporate governance. The real inquiry is
therefore whether the existing blend of market and regulatory controls of corporate governance should be abandoned.
More affirmatively, perhaps, what might be the benefits of
such a mix?
IV. A ROLE FOR MIXED GOVERNANCE IN CORPORATE LAW?
If criticism of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's "federalization"
of corporate law comes down to a preference for a marketdriven regime of corporate governance, an aspiration
indisputably threatened by the Act's "nationalization" of
certain rules of corporate governance, what is the validity of
this critique? As noted at the outset, there are undoubtedly
legitimate criticisms of Sarbanes-Oxley's corporate governance provisions on the merits. Aspects of its procedural
design might also be challenged. Generalized critiques of
any and all federal interventions in corporate law, by
contrast, appear more difficult to sustain. Neither doctrinal
distinctions between corporate law and securities law, nor
the asserted benefits of federalism, nor the expected
promise of experimentation and competition, offer a
categorical bar against any and all incidents of nationalization in corporate law. Going beyond the shortcomings of the
arguments against Sarbanes- Oxley's selective nationalization, however, I hope to conclude by suggesting the
affirmative arguments in favor of such intervention and a
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resulting mix of federal and state rules of corporate governance.
One might begin with the status quo. That the
regulatory dynamic at work in corporate law is characterized by a largely stable regime of "mixed governance" might
arguably be seen as some evidence of its wisdom. A mix of
rules-public, mandatory, and federal, as well as private,
enabling, and state-thus characterize modern corporate
law. Lending dynamism to this mix, regulatory competition,
both among state legislatures and between federal and
state regulators, is pervasive. Finally, judicial policing of
this competition with reference to congressional intent, in
order to minimize the abuse of federal power, helps to
complete the picture.
Within this status quo, forces of privatization and
nationalization balance one another in the regulation of
business associations. In political economy generally, this
pattern has been styled a "third way."96 Within this
paradigm, a mix of public and is seen to foster efficient
growth. Some balance between the poles of privatization
and nationalization, then, might be as suited to corporate
governance as it is to the economy generally.
Other arguments also favor allowance for some
selective nationalization of corporate law, and a resulting
blend of federal and state rules of corporate governance.
One might begin with the mixed nature of the corporation
itself. As suggested above, notwithstanding its recent
conception as private and contractual, early notions of the
corporation saw it as public in nature. Recently, moreover,
scholars have begun to challenge the private paradigm in
corporate law. Communitarian conceptions of the firm have
received growing attention. 97 Attention to the external
impacts of hostile takeovers is in a similar spirit. 98 More
generally, the necessary role of the state behind any nexus

96. See, e.g., Stephen Turner, The Third Way, Soc'Y, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 10.
97. See PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995);
Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporationin
Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, L. & CONTEMP.

PROBS., Summer 1999, at 9.
98. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,1990 DuKE L.J. 201, 256-61.
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of contracts is impossible to dispute. 99 Finally, Bert
Westbrook's "reimagination" of the public character of
corporate governance, grounded in the essential social
utility of capitalist mechanisms of public ordering, also
deserves note. 100
External to the corporation, the wide distribution of
share ownership in recent years also favors some public
dimension of corporate law. Through the rise of defined
contribution retirement plans and mutual funds generally,
equity ownership in the United States has grown dramatically in recent years. By the start of 2002, nearly half of
U.S. households owned equities, based on a rise of more
than seven percent over the bear market years of 1999 to
2001.101 Given as much, corporate failures, and even in-

efficiencies, have direct and potentially dramatic public
implications.
Growing evidence of a correlation between strong
capital markets and economic growth may also favor a
federal, mandatory, and public dimension of corporate
regulation. 102 Well-functioning securities markets may offer
a boost of as much as 1.6% in annual per capita GDP
growth.'0 3 More to the point, optimal regulatory regimes
10 4 If
are likewise correlated with accelerated growth.
optimal corporate governance is a component of economic
development, of course, the argument for some public
dimension in its regulation grows more compelling.

99. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 443 (1989). Other criticism of the
contractarian conception of the firm is cited in Westbrook, supra note 20, at 108
n.284.
100. See Westbrook, supra note 20, at 118.
101. See Press Release, Securities Industry Association, Half of American
Households Own Equities (Sept. 27, 2002), http://www.sia.com/press/2002
pressreleases/html/pr-equity-ownership.html.
102. See Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence (NBER
Working Paper No. 10766, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w10766.pdf.
103. See Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Market Development and LongRun Growth, 10 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 323 (1996).
104. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52
J. FIN. 1131 (1997).
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Finally, the potential for market failure in certain
aspects of corporate governance and the securities markets
would also favor a place for limited public regulation of
business associations. In recent years, scholars have
pointed to a variety of potential inefficiencies. The tendency
of network externalities to constrain efficient innovation
10 5
and variation has been the subject of wide attention.
Patterns of inertia may have similar effects. 106 Finally, the
recurrent pattern of market breaks in the securities
markets has also been highlighted as evidence of some
informational inefficiency. 107 If the markets functioned as
advertised, such breaks should not occur; with growing
frequency, however, they do.
Beyond this familiar litany of arguments for selective
federal intervention in corporate law, I would propose to go
a step further, to suggest the affirmative benefits of "mixed
governance" in corporate law. Sarbanes-Oxley and similar
federal rules of corporate governance, I would posit, create
a distinct jurisdictional pattern in corporate law. Contrary
to the clean jurisdictional lines falsely promised by the
doctrinal separation of federal securities law from state
corporate law, Sarbanes-Oxley creates a regime of
"jurisdictional redundancy." The particular third way
between public and private in corporate law (and perhaps
in securities regulation as well) may thus depend not on a
tidy segregation of jurisdiction, but on its duplication.
Corporate governance, within such a scheme, would
simultaneously be subject to ordinary mandatory regulation
by federal authorities, and market-driven enabling
regulation by state authorities. The respective jurisdictional
role of the federal and the state government-of regulation
versus the market-would cease to be determinate in any
familiar sense. Rather, the regulation of business associations would play out in an indeterminate climate of regula105. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of
Law in the Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (2003);
Michael Klausner, Corporations,CorporateLaw, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REV. 757 (1995).
106. See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation:
The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1583 (1998).
107. See Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About
It, 61 U. PiTT. L. REV. 741 (2000).
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tory competition and coordination, of delegation, and of
presumptive deference to the market.
Some twenty-five years ago, Robert Cover and
Alexander Aleinikoff pointed to the overlapping jurisdiction
of state criminal courts and federal habeas courts as driving
a pattern of "dialectical federalism."10 8 In their view, the
redundant jurisdiction of these courts, and the resulting
need to engage one another, offered the promise of a beneficial evolution in norms of constitutional criminal procedure.
More broadly, Robert Schapiro describes a pattern of
"interactive federalism" as a potential substitute for traditional dualism in the allocation of federal and state
jurisdiction. 109 Rather than seeking to draw clear lines of
federal and state jurisdiction-a failed project-Schapiro
counsels our embrace of "polyphonic" patterns of interaction
to advance the goals of federalism. In this scheme, federal
and state courts enjoy overlapping jurisdiction, necessitating their active engagement of one another in the progressive resolution of disputes.
I have previously considered the potential for a similar
dynamic of "dialectical review" in the interaction of
international tribunals and U.S. courts under the North
American Free Trade Agreement. 110 By virtue of its design,
Chapter 11 of the Agreement forces domestic courts and
investor-state dispute tribunals to engage one another on
questions governed by both domestic law and the customary
law norms enshrined in the Agreement. Jurisdictional
avoidance is impossible, for the simple reason that the
relevant adjudicators' jurisdiction overlaps.
Yet this is just the point: such overlap may have
significant utility. Most obviously, it may help to ensure
that issues are not overlooked, and that process failures do
not consequently interfere with optimal regulation (or deregulation, for that matter). Such fail-safe mechanisms,
however, represent only part of the utility of redundant
jurisdictional authority. In the regulation of business
associations, thus, the regulatory infrastructure may
108. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
109. See Schapiro, supra note 56.
110. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International
Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004).
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further favor overlap, in light of state authorities' limited
ability to impose even efficient mandatory rules. Given
charter competition among the states, such rules may be
difficult to sustain, at least in the short-term. The
imposition of mandatory rules in corporate law may consequently require a regime of some jurisdictional redundancy.
The most significant role for redundant regulatory
jurisdiction, however, may be its capacity to encourage
desirable innovation. In the interaction of distinct and
independent regulatory authorities, with distinct and
independent approaches, conceptions, and constituencies,
greater potential for efficient change might be predicted.' 1 '
The conventional bounding of jurisdictional lines is
necessarily effective in minimizing conflict, but is also likely
to favor stasis, for the very same reason. External shocks
may thus be an essential source of systemic change. More
temperately, institutional designs that necessitate interaction with distinctly situated actors, motivated by distinct
incentives, might be expected to encourage efficient innovation.
In corporate law, the interaction between federal and
state regulators might arguably be conceived in some such
fashion. Mark Roe has documented a pattern of state
responsiveness to federal pressure in corporate governance. 112 Yet federal regulation may also respond to state

111. See id. at 2063-86.
112. See generally Roe, supra note 41; see also Renee M. Jones, Rethinking
CorporateFederalismin the Era of CorporateReform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 644-46
(2004) (describing evidence of jurisprudential shift in Delaware decisions
following Sarbanes-Oxley); Karmel, supra note 36, at 137-38 (referencing state
judicial response to Sarbanes-Oxley, and suggesting several areas in which
federal and state regulatory authorities might compete to offer further reform,
following the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley). The pattern of jurisdictional
redundancy I posit, of course, speaks directly to the paradigm of federal
domination outlined by Mark Roe. The model offered above might thus be
conceived as a normative theory of the federal-state interaction studied by Roe.
I do not dispute the potential for the hierarchical pattern of engagement Roe
describes, as distinct from the dialectical engagement I outline. I am simply less
sure, as I will suggest, that the pattern of congressional intervention to date can
be fairly understood in quite so heavy-handed a light. By contrast with Roe, I
would conceive state rules of corporate law as arising in the shadow of federal
law, rather than as a product of it.
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interests. 113 So long as federal authority is not unbounded,
it too must respond to its regulatory counterpart. Cover and
Aleinikoff found the inability of federal habeas courts to
mandate application of their constitutional interpretations
in state criminal trials to be the source of the dialectical
engagement they observe." 4 To similar effect is the
interaction of international tribunals and domestic courts
under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement. 115 Where neither party can impose its will on
the other, it must necessarily engage with the other, and
with the latter's perspectives and positions, in order to
effectuate its will.
Can this be said of the dynamic at work in the
regulation of corporate governance? As noted above, critics
of Sarbanes-Oxley have highlighted the aggressive
jurisdiction-grabbing to which the SEC has been prone. If
this criticism is on point, jurisdictional redundancy in
corporate law may be a fleeting phenomenon; shared
jurisdiction may only be as expansive as the SEC's limited
willingness to share.
Whatever the avariciousness of the SEC, however, I
would question the painting of Congress with an identical
brush. While a harsh public choice accounting of the
113. Cf. Romano, supra note 20, at 34-36 (suggesting back-and-forth pattern
of interaction between federal and state regulators, regarding going-private
transactions). Several scholars have explored the benefits of some shared
federal and state role in corporate governance or securities law, though not
within the particular frame of jurisdictional redundancy I posit. See, e.g.,
Stefania A. Di Trolio, Public Choice Theory, Federalism,and the Sunny Side to
Blue-Sky Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1279 (2004) (offering public choice
argument for "dual enforcement" of securities law); Renee M. Jones, Dynamic
Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN.
INS. L.J. 107 (2005) (exploring utility of overlapping jurisdiction in securities
enforcement); Jones, supra note 112. Bob Thompson's exploration of
"collaborative" regulation of corporate governance deserves particular note, for
its emphasis on the relationship of federal regulation and the body of private
rules imposed by self-regulatory organizations, including the New York Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ. See Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate
Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 961 (2003). The latter have not been an emphasis herein, given
my primary interest to explore the relationship of federal and state constraints
on corporate governance, but clearly warrant attention in any comprehensive
analysis of mixed governance in corporate law.
114. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supranote 108, at 1049, 1052-53.
115. See Ahdieh, supranote 110, at 2101-08.
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regulatory history of the SEC may be well-warranted, it is
not clear that Congress can be accused of a similar
willingness to broadly preempt state legislative authority
over corporate governance. Whatever the breadth of
Sarbanes-Oxley's intervention in corporate law, it surely
cannot be construed as a general preemption of state
authority. No one would argue that corporate law is now
federal law. Nor has Congress generally shown itself prone
to dramatic expansions of federal law in the regulation of
business associations. 1 16 However forcefully some have
criticized the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act's interventions in state law, we do well to
recall that it is decrees of nearly seventy-five years ago that
are at issue in such debates.
Of course, even a deferential stance of Congress toward
state corporate law would mean little for jurisdictional
redundancy, if the SEC's efforts at preemption were not
subject to check. Yet here, the courts have been reasonably
effective. Over a long line of cases, the judiciary has shown
itself ready to police the SEC's adherence to its legislative
mandates. 117 Most importantly, the courts have subjected
SEC rules to an inquiry into congressional intent, seeking
evidence of a clear legislative mandate for SEC regulations
preempting state corporate law. Given as much,
overlapping federal and state jurisdiction in corporate law
1 8
need not-of necessity-collapse into federal jurisdiction.
116. Among other explanations, this may be rooted in affirmative political
checks on broad congressional intervention in corporate law, see Romano, supra
note 20, at 39-40, as well as political inertia at the congressional level.
117. See Licht, supra note 44, at 608 (citing attempts by SEC to regulate
corporate law that were rejected on judicial review); Romano, supra note 6, at
1523; see also Karmel, supra note 36, at 84-86 (discussing cases in which
judicial interventions in state corporate law have ultimately been curtailed).
The disaggregation of federal authorities into their constituent parts, thus, may
be important to an understanding of the general prospects of a preemption of
broad swaths of corporate law.
118. On a further potential danger of jurisdictional redundancy, see, e.g.,
Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism,
(SSRN,
Working
Paper
no.
770305,
2005),
available
at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=770305. In a similar spirit, Bill Buzbee has explored
failures of the "regulatory commons." See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the
Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IowA L. REV. 1 (2003); cf.
Jones, supra note 113, at 127-29 (exploring risks of "balkanization" of
regulation in dual system). The prospects of regulatory avoidance, then, must
be weighed against the potential utility of redundant jurisdiction.
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More concretely, evidence of a dialectical dynamic
between federal and state regulators of business
associations is offered by occasions on which federal
regulators have followed a state lead. In such cases,
Congress and the SEC can be understood to have
borrowed-even learned-from state regulatory authorities.
Most broadly, the 1933 Securities Act, having drawn its
terms from the corpus of existing state securities law, can
be fairly conceived in this light. More recently, SEC
regulation of mutual fund practices can indisputably be
traced to the initial enforcement efforts of Eliot Spitzer, in
his capacity as Attorney General of the State of New York.
While the latter is, of course, distinct from the pattern
explored herein, it is suggestive of the potential for a twoway regulatory street. 119
Beyond the threat of federal power, a further rejoinder
to my proposed model of shared federal and state
jurisdiction over corporate governance might question its
importance as a source of innovation. Such innovation, of
course, is the very point of state authority over corporate
law. It is by virtue of state competition, thus, that state
legislatures have incentives to innovate and thereby
develop optimal corporate law regimes. As Bill Carney and
others have highlighted, moreover, the capacity of state
corporate law for innovation is quite significant. 120 Federal
regulation, by contrast, is not subject to similar competitive
pressures and is consequently likely to be less prone to
innovation.
I would not dispute the premise behind this argument;
rather, I question whether the virtues of the existing
system might not be further advanced with some limited
room for federal intervention. With meaningful constraints
on federal authority, thus, a dominant dynamic of
competition-even between federal and state regulatory
agents-is likely to persist. Some provision for vertical
119. The case of Spitzer and the SEC may suggest an entirely distinct way
in which federal interventions in corporate law may be constrained in a regime
of jurisdictional redundancy. Echoing the interaction of federal and state courts
in habeas review of state criminal convictions, the focus of Cover and
Aleinikoffs model of dialectical federalism, state regulators may go a long way
to constrain federal regulation, simply through their capacity to make a
nuisance.
120. See Carney, supra note 62.
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competition, moreover, might offer unique benefits. As
noted above, this begins with a mixed regime's capacity to
impose (and perhaps merely threaten) at least some
mandatory regulation. Additionally, federal regulators are
necessarily distinct in perspective, in specialization, in
resources, and the like, by comparison with the state
legislative bodies responsible for innovation in state
corporate law. 121 If so, incorporation of vertical competition
into a regime of horizontal competition might be expected to
enhance the collective capacity for innovation in corporate
law. 122
It bears emphasizing that the pattern of jurisdictional
redundancy I offer need not mean that the regulation of
business associations-and of corporate
governance
particularly-is indiscriminately shared by federal and
state regulators. Borrowing from the unsuccessful effort to
distinguish sharply between a process-oriented federal
securities law and a substance-oriented state corporate law,
one might conceive of a generalized, if not unvarying,
123
orientation of federal regulation to questions of form.
Notably, such a distinction might be seen to echo other
recent federal interventions in areas of traditional state
authority. The No Child Left Behind Act, for example,
might be said to prescribe certain institutions in primary
and secondary education, but not to mandate the
mechanisms of their creation or the details of their
operation.

121. The failure of state corporate law to offer any immediate response to
Enron and its successor scandals might be suggestive in this regard. While the
aggressive federal intervention embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may well
have discouraged state action, some part of that silence might also be traced to
distinct perspectives and pressures disfavoring intervention at the state, versus
federal, level. If so, then the opportunity for federal intervention is necessarily
of value.
122. In discussing the utility of vertical competition as a supplement to
horizontal competition, I should clarify that I do not mean to invoke a
Canadian-style system of corporate law, in which the option of federal
incorporation competes with provincial alternatives. While a regime of
jurisdictional redundancy might include provision for federal incorporation, it
need not. Rather, its core feature is a place for selective federal rules of
corporate law, with general application.
123. The process-substance distinction thus might support some prudential
emphasis on process, even if it cannot support an absolute constraint against
any and all federal regulation of substantive corporate law.
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provisions
Sarbanes- Oxley's corporate governance
Act
requires
might fairly be construed in such terms. The
certification of financial statements, for example, but does
not prescribe rules for the preparation and review of those
statements. Similarly, it does not delve into the content of
audits, but requires their preparation by disinterested
auditors, selected by disinterested board members. Even
allowing for a substantial degree of SEC rule-making, much
of Sarbanes-Oxley's implementation will consequently be a
product of private ordering. As such, the Act leaves
to play out, within
significant room for private incentives
124
its specific requirements of form.
Beyond judicial policing of federal interventions into
corporate law to ensure congressional authorization, as well
as a primary orientation of such interventions to matters of
form, a further beneficial constraint might be borrowed
from Roberta Romano. Even if only as a second-best
alternative to repeal, Romano recommends the incorporation of sunset provisions into Sarbanes-Oxley's corporate
governance provisions. 125 Given an appreciation of the
desirable limits of mixed governance-the value of
permitting some scope for jurisdictional redundancy, but
also limiting that scope-the use of sunset provisions is
attractive. Even beyond Sarbanes-Oxley, thus, one might
imagine a generalized model in which mandatory
interventions by federal authorities in corporate law,
whether legislative or regulatory, would be subject to
sunset review, renewal, or revocation.
As the several constraints offered above-judicial
policing of federal interventions into corporate law, a
presumptive orientation of such interventions to issues of
process, and mandatory sunset review-collectively
acknowledge, federal interventions in corporate governance
are different in kind than state interventions. Because of
their preemptive power, the costs of error, if not the risks as
well, are necessarily greater. Rather than resolving these
124. See Brett H. McDonnell, Sox Appeals, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 506.

From this perspective, Sarbanes-Oxley's prohibition on corporate loans to
officers may be the most difficult of its corporate governance provisions to
justify. For among the latter, it stands apart in seeming to go quite explicitly
beyond form. Notably, in this vein, it has been the subject of particular
criticism.
125. See Romano, supra note 6, at 1600-02.
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difficulties with an absolute proscription against such
intervention, however, a regime of shared jurisdiction with
appropriate constraints offers a compromise position.
Creating a balance of jurisdictional authority, it would
permit neither unconstrained market authority, nor
unbounded regulatory authority. A balance of this sort may
best meet the needs of a complex corporate marketplace.
CONCLUSION

For all the talk of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's
"federalization" of corporate law, critics of the legislation on
this ground do not speak to any inherent question of federal
versus state power. Nor do they seek to preserve
meaningfully distinct bodies of federal securities law and
state corporate law. Even regulatory competition is not the
point. Rather, it would seem, the real aspiration is to leave
corporate governance to the asserted efficiencies of marketmediated private incentives, precluding the undesirable
imposition of public regulation.
Once we understand as much, we can dispense with the
rhetoric of "federalization" and take up the real issue at
stake. Is some role for effective mandatory regulation,
however limited and constrained, appropriate in corporate
law? I offer a preliminary argument in favor of mixed
governance, suggesting the utility of a regime of jurisdictional redundancy in fostering efficient innovation in
corporate law. While susceptible to abuse, and consequently
requiring effective constraint, selective federal regulation of
corporate governance may offer a fruitful avenue of vertical
competition, to supplement the horizontal competition at
the heart of the present-day corporate law regime.

